In the modern free market of relationships, our dignity is our currency and our texts are private investments. Each DM, much like a stock, carries an implicit cost but offers unlimited upside. This might compel one to gamble, not by longing cryto, but with sending a dangerous double-text. The risk of a potential social faux pas is much too great, but so seems the potential gain. With every hour that passes, the cost—your time, attention and internal validation—of your texts increases. For the receiver, every hour that passes before they respond seems to inflate their dignity and value. So where is this equilibrium? Furthermore, this equilibrium is complicated by information asymmetry. You don’t know if the other person saw it, or got too busy, or became disinterested, or simply died. Under imperfect information, it is hard to discern the most rational decision to choose without carefully analyzing the potential payoffs.

In a conversation between two individuals, each player has two strategies. Kelly Kapoor must decide whether to double-text and Ryan Howard can choose to respond or wait. Therefore, there are four potential outcomes. If they both wait, they are left in mutual silence without emotional losses. Kelly gains 0 and Ryan gains 0. If Kelly double-texts and Ryan still doesn’t respond, Kelly suffers an emotional loss of -2 while Ryan gains an ego boost of 5. The same is true vice versa. However, if they both begin texting at the same time, it would lead to a lovely conversation where they both gain 3.

Ideally, Kelly and Ryan both cooperate and stay in the top-left scenario. However, Ryan knows that if Kelly double-texts, it is better to withhold his reply and enjoy an ego boost of +5. If Ryan responds, Kelly would also decide it is better to wait. In reality, both players are stuck in the bottom right scenario of wait-wait. They are stuck in a classic example of a prisoner’s dilemma, when two individuals choose not to cooperate even though it is in their best interest to do so, therefore they are stuck with a mediocre outcome.




Kelly




Double-texts
Waits
Ryan
Responds
Kelly's payoff: 3
Ryan's Payoff: 3
Kelly's Payoff: 5
Ryan's Payoff: -2
Waits
Kelly's Payoff: -2
Ryan's Payoff: 5
Kelly's Payoff: 0
Ryan's Payoff: 0


Rest assured, Kelly and Ryan are not trapped in this dilemma forever. The key to breaking this prisoner’s dilemma is by stimulating repeated games in indefinite rounds of texting. As co-workers, Kelly and Ryan will inevitably text again. If either player ignores, they forgo lovely conversations in the future. Even if there is one additional conversation, each player ought to keep texting as two lovely conversations outweighs the ego boost of leaving your partner unanswered. With this added parameter, players will choose to cooperate, resolving the prisoner’s dilemma. The most rational strategy for every texter is to press send.


Works Cited

Aumann, Robert J.. "16. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games". Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV, edited by Albert William Tucker and Robert Duncan Luce, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, pp. 287-324. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400882168-018
“The Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Heritage Project, University of Michigan, 1 Nov. 2021, heritage.umich.edu/stories/the-prisoners-dilemma/.